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Diffstat (limited to 'sway')
| -rw-r--r-- | sway/sway-security.7.txt | 239 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 239 deletions
diff --git a/sway/sway-security.7.txt b/sway/sway-security.7.txt deleted file mode 100644 index c8d6758c..00000000 --- a/sway/sway-security.7.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,239 +0,0 @@ -///// -vim:set ts=4 sw=4 tw=82 noet: -///// -sway-security (7) -================= - -Name ----- -sway-security - Guidelines for securing your sway install - -Security Overview ------------------ - -**Sway is NOT secure**. We are working on it but do not trust that we have it all -figured out yet. The following man page is provisional. - -Securing sway requires careful configuration of your environment, the sort that's -usually best suited to a distribution maintainer who wants to ship a secure sway -environment in their distribution. Sway provides a number of means of securing it but -you must make a few changes external to sway first. - -Configuration of security features is limited to files in the security directory -(this is likely /etc/sway/security.d/*, but depends on your installation prefix). -Files in this directory must be owned by root:root and chmod 644 or 444. The default -security configuration is installed to /etc/sway/security.d/00-defaults, and -should not be modified - it will be updated with the latest recommended security -defaults between releases. To override the defaults, you should add more files to -this directory. - -Environment security --------------------- - -LD_PRELOAD is a mechanism designed to ruin the security of your system. There are -a number of strategies for dealing with this, but they all suck a little. In order -of most practical to least practical: - -1. Only run important programs via exec. Sway's exec command will ensure that - LD_PRELOAD is unset when running programs. - -2. Remove LD_PRELOAD support from your dynamic loader (requires patching libc). - This may break programs that rely on LD_PRELOAD for legitimate functionality, - but this is the most effective solution. - -3. Use static linking for important programs. Of course statically linked programs - are unaffected by the dynamic linking security dumpster fire. - -Note that should you choose method 1, you MUST ensure that sway itself isn't -compromised by LD_PRELOAD. It probably isn't, but you can be sure by setting -/usr/bin/sway to a+s (setuid), which will instruct the dynamic linker not to -permit LD_PRELOAD for it (and will also run it as root, which sway will shortly -drop). You could also statically link sway itself. - -Note that LD_LIBRARY_PATH has all of these problems, and the same solutions. - -Read your log -------------- - -Sway does sanity checks and prints big red warnings to stderr if they fail. Read -them. - -Feature policies ----------------- - -Certain sway features are security sensitive and may be configured with security -policies. These features are: - -**background**:: - Permission for a program to become the background. - -**fullscreen**:: - Permission to become fullscreen. Note that users can always make a window - fullscreen themselves with the fullscreen command. - -**ipc**:: - Permission to connect to sway's IPC socket. - -**keyboard**:: - Permission to receive keyboard events (only while they are focused). - -**lock**:: - Permission for a program to act as a screen locker. This involves becoming - fullscreen (on all outputs) and receiving _all_ keyboard and mouse input for - the duration of the process. - -**mouse**:: - Permission to receive mouse events (only while the mouse is over them). - -**panel**:: - Permission for a program to stick its windows to the sides of the screen. - -**screenshot**:: - Permission to take screenshots or record the screen. - -By default, no permissions are granted (though saner defaults are provided in -/etc/sway/config.d/security). You can use the following configuration options to control -a program's access: - -**permit** <executable> <features...>:: - Permits <executable> to use <features> (each feature separated by a space). - <executable> may be * to affect the default policy, or the full path to the - executable file. - -**reject** <executable> <features...>:: - Disallows <executable> from using <features> (each feature separated by a space). - <executable> may be * to affect the default policy, or the full path to the - executable file. - -Note that policy enforcement requires procfs to be mounted at /proc and the sway -process to be able to access _/proc/[pid]/exe_ (see **procfs(5)** for details on -this access - setcap cap_sys_ptrace=eip /usr/bin/sway should do the trick). If -sway is unable to read _/proc/[pid]/exe_, it will apply the default policy. - -To work correctly, sway's own programs require the following permissions: - -- swaybg: background -- swaylock: lock, keyboard -- swaybar: panel, mouse, ipc -- swaygrab: screenshot, ipc - -When you first declare a policy for an executable, it will inherit the default -policy. Further changes to the default policy will not retroactively affect which -permissions an earlier policy inherits. You must explicitly reject any features -from the default policy that you do not want an executable to receive permission -for. - -Command policies ----------------- - -You can also control the context from which a command may execute. The different -contexts you can control are: - -**config**:: - Can be run from your config file. - -**binding**:: - Can be run from bindsym or bindcode commands. - -**ipc**:: - Can be run by IPC clients. - -**criteria**:: - Can be run when evaluating window criteria. - -**all**:: - Shorthand for granting permission in all contexts. - -By default a command is allowed to execute in any context. To configure this, open -a commands block and fill it with policies: - - commands { - <name> <contexts...> - ... - } - -For example, you could do this to limit the use of the focus command to just -binding and criteria: - - commands { - focus binding criteria - } - -Setting a command policy overwrites any previous policy that was in place. - -IPC policies ------------- - -Disabling IPC access via swaymsg is encouraged if you intend to secure the IPC -socket, because any program that can execute swaymsg could circumvent its own -security policy by simply invoking swaymsg. - -You can configure which features of IPC are available for particular clients: - - ipc <executable> { - ... - } - -You may use * for <executable> to configure the default policy for all clients. -Configuring IPC policies for specific executables is not supported on FreeBSD, and -the default policy will be applied to all IPC connections. - -The following commands are available within this block: - -**bar-config** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_BAR_CONFIG (required for swaybar to work at all). - -**command** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls executing sway commands via IPC. - -**inputs** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_INPUTS (input device information). - -**marks** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_MARKS. - -**outputs** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_OUTPUTS. - -**tree** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_TREE. - -**workspaces** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls GET_WORKSPACES. - -You can also control which IPC events can be raised with an events block: - - ipc <executable> { - events { - ... - } - } - -The following commands are valid within an IPC events block: - -**binding** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls keybinding notifications (disabled by default). - -**input** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls input device hotplugging notifications. - -**mode** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls output hotplugging notifications. - -**output** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls output hotplugging notifications. - -**window** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls window event notifications. - -**workspace** <enabled|disabled>:: - Controls workspace notifications. - -In each of these blocks, you may use * (as in "* enabled" or "* disabled") to -control access to every feature at once. - -Authors -------- -Maintained by Drew DeVault <sir@cmpwn.com>, who is assisted by other open -source contributors. For more information about sway development, see -<https://github.com/swaywm/sway>. |