From b6fef599bf8493480664b766040fa9b0d4b1e335 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: William Hubbs Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 09:15:59 -0600 Subject: checkpath: fix CVE-2018-21269 This walks the directory path to the file we are going to manipulate to make sure that when we create the file and change the ownership and permissions we are working on the same file. Also, all non-terminal symbolic links must be owned by root. This will keep a non-root user from making a symbolic link as described in the bug. If root creates the symbolic link, it is assumed to be trusted. On non-linux platforms, we no longer follow non-terminal symbolic links by default. If you need to do that, add the -s option on the checkpath command line, but keep in mind that this is not secure. This fixes #201. --- src/rc/checkpath.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'src') diff --git a/src/rc/checkpath.c b/src/rc/checkpath.c index 448c9cf8..ff54a892 100644 --- a/src/rc/checkpath.c +++ b/src/rc/checkpath.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ * except according to the terms contained in the LICENSE file. */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include @@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ typedef enum { const char *applet = NULL; const char *extraopts ="path1 [path2] [...]"; -const char *getoptstring = "dDfFpm:o:W" getoptstring_COMMON; +const char *getoptstring = "dDfFpm:o:sW" getoptstring_COMMON; const struct option longopts[] = { { "directory", 0, NULL, 'd'}, { "directory-truncate", 0, NULL, 'D'}, @@ -53,6 +55,7 @@ const struct option longopts[] = { { "pipe", 0, NULL, 'p'}, { "mode", 1, NULL, 'm'}, { "owner", 1, NULL, 'o'}, + { "symlinks", 0, NULL, 's'}, { "writable", 0, NULL, 'W'}, longopts_COMMON }; @@ -64,15 +67,92 @@ const char * const longopts_help[] = { "Create a named pipe (FIFO) if not exists", "Mode to check", "Owner to check (user:group)", + "follow symbolic links (irrelivent on linux)", "Check whether the path is writable or not", longopts_help_COMMON }; const char *usagestring = NULL; +static int get_dirfd(char *path, bool symlinks) { + char *ch; + char *item; + char *linkpath = NULL; + char *path_dupe; + char *str; + int components = 0; + int dirfd; + int flags = 0; + int new_dirfd; + struct stat st; + ssize_t linksize; + + if (!path || *path != '/') + eerrorx("%s: empty or relative path", applet); + dirfd = openat(dirfd, "/", O_RDONLY); + if (dirfd == -1) + eerrorx("%s: unable to open the root directory: %s", + applet, strerror(errno)); + path_dupe = xstrdup(path); + ch = path_dupe; + while (*ch) { + if (*ch == '/') + components++; + ch++; + } + item = strtok(path_dupe, "/"); +#ifdef O_PATH + flags |= O_PATH; +#endif + if (!symlinks) + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; + flags |= O_RDONLY; + while (dirfd > 0 && item && components > 1) { + str = xstrdup(linkpath ? linkpath : item); + new_dirfd = openat(dirfd, str, flags); + if (new_dirfd == -1) + eerrorx("%s: %s: could not open %s: %s", applet, path, str, + strerror(errno)); + if (fstat(new_dirfd, &st) == -1) + eerrorx("%s: %s: unable to stat %s: %s", applet, path, item, + strerror(errno)); + if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) ) { + if (st.st_uid != 0) + eerrorx("%s: %s: synbolic link %s not owned by root", + applet, path, str); + linksize = st.st_size+1; + if (linkpath) + free(linkpath); + linkpath = xmalloc(linksize); + memset(linkpath, 0, linksize); + if (readlinkat(new_dirfd, "", linkpath, linksize) != st.st_size) + eerrorx("%s: symbolic link destination changed", applet); + /* + * now follow the symlink. + */ + close(new_dirfd); + } else { + close(dirfd); + dirfd = new_dirfd; + free(linkpath); + linkpath = NULL; + item = strtok(NULL, "/"); + components--; + } + } + free(path_dupe); + if (linkpath) { + free(linkpath); + linkpath = NULL; + } + return dirfd; +} + static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, - inode_t type, bool trunc, bool chowner, bool selinux_on) + inode_t type, bool trunc, bool chowner, bool symlinks, bool selinux_on) { struct stat st; + char *name = NULL; + int dirfd; int fd; int flags; int r; @@ -93,14 +173,16 @@ static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, #endif if (trunc) flags |= O_TRUNC; - readfd = open(path, readflags); + xasprintf(&name, "%s", basename_c(path)); + dirfd = get_dirfd(path, symlinks); + readfd = openat(dirfd, name, readflags); if (readfd == -1 || (type == inode_file && trunc)) { if (type == inode_file) { einfo("%s: creating file", path); if (!mode) /* 664 */ mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IROTH; u = umask(0); - fd = open(path, flags, mode); + fd = openat(dirfd, name, flags, mode); umask(u); if (fd == -1) { eerror("%s: open: %s", applet, strerror(errno)); @@ -122,7 +204,7 @@ static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, strerror (errno)); return -1; } - readfd = open(path, readflags); + readfd = openat(dirfd, name, readflags); if (readfd == -1) { eerror("%s: unable to open directory: %s", applet, strerror(errno)); @@ -140,7 +222,7 @@ static int do_check(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, strerror (errno)); return -1; } - readfd = open(path, readflags); + readfd = openat(dirfd, name, readflags); if (readfd == -1) { eerror("%s: unable to open fifo: %s", applet, strerror(errno)); @@ -259,6 +341,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) int retval = EXIT_SUCCESS; bool trunc = false; bool chowner = false; + bool symlinks = false; bool writable = false; bool selinux_on = false; @@ -293,6 +376,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) eerrorx("%s: owner `%s' not found", applet, optarg); break; + case 's': +#ifndef O_PATH + symlinks = true; +#endif + break; case 'W': writable = true; break; @@ -320,7 +408,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) while (optind < argc) { if (writable) exit(!is_writable(argv[optind])); - if (do_check(argv[optind], uid, gid, mode, type, trunc, chowner, selinux_on)) + if (do_check(argv[optind], uid, gid, mode, type, trunc, chowner, + symlinks, selinux_on)) retval = EXIT_FAILURE; optind++; } -- cgit v1.2.3