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-rw-r--r--srp/src/client.rs327
-rw-r--r--srp/src/lib.rs7
-rw-r--r--srp/src/prime.bin1
-rw-r--r--srp/src/server.rs243
-rw-r--r--srp/src/test/k_sha1_1024.bin (renamed from srp/src/k_sha1_1024.bin)0
-rw-r--r--srp/src/types.rs72
-rw-r--r--srp/src/utils.rs45
7 files changed, 350 insertions, 345 deletions
diff --git a/srp/src/client.rs b/srp/src/client.rs
index 815b195..ee8fd8d 100644
--- a/srp/src/client.rs
+++ b/srp/src/client.rs
@@ -2,275 +2,242 @@
//!
//! # Usage
//! First create SRP client struct by passing to it SRP parameters (shared
-//! between client and server) and randomly generated `a`:
+//! between client and server).
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! use srp::groups::G_2048;
-//! use sha2::Sha256;
+//! You can use SHA1 from SRP-6a, but it's highly recommended to use specialized
+//! password hashing algorithm instead (e.g. PBKDF2, argon2 or scrypt).
//!
-//! let mut a = [0u8; 64];
-//! rng.fill_bytes(&mut a);
-//! let client = SrpClient::<Sha256>::new(&a, &G_2048);
+//! ```rust
+//! use crate::srp::groups::G_2048;
+//! use sha2::Sha256; // Note: You should probably use a proper password KDF
+//! # use crate::srp::client::SrpClient;
+//!
+//! let client = SrpClient::<Sha256>::new(&G_2048);
//! ```
//!
//! Next send handshake data (username and `a_pub`) to the server and receive
//! `salt` and `b_pub`:
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let a_pub = client.get_a_pub();
-//! let (salt, b_pub) = conn.send_handshake(username, a_pub);
+//! ```rust
+//! # let client = crate::srp::client::SrpClient::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # fn server_response()-> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) { (vec![], vec![]) }
+//!
+//! let mut a = [0u8; 64];
+//! // rng.fill_bytes(&mut a);
+//! let a_pub = client.compute_public_ephemeral(&a);
+//! let (salt, b_pub) = server_response();
//! ```
//!
-//! Compute private key using `salt` with any password hashing function.
-//! You can use method from SRP-6a, but it's recommended to use specialized
-//! password hashing algorithm instead (e.g. PBKDF2, argon2 or scrypt).
-//! Next create verifier instance, note that `get_verifier` consumes client and
-//! can return error in case of malicious `b_pub`.
+//! Process the server response and create verifier instance.
+//! process_reply can return error in case of malicious `b_pub`.
+//!
+//! ```rust
+//! # let client = crate::srp::client::SrpClient::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let a = [0u8; 64];
+//! # let username = b"username";
+//! # let password = b"password";
+//! # let salt = b"salt";
+//! # let b_pub = b"b_pub";
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let private_key = srp_private_key::<Sha256>(username, password, salt);
-//! let verifier = client.get_verifier(&private_key, &b_pub)?;
+//! let private_key = (username, password, salt);
+//! let verifier = client.process_reply(&a, username, password, salt, b_pub);
//! ```
//!
//! Finally verify the server: first generate user proof,
//! send it to the server and verify server proof in the reply. Note that
//! `verify_server` method will return error in case of incorrect server reply.
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let user_proof = verifier.get_proof();
-//! let server_proof = conn.send_proof(user_proof);
-//! let key = verifier.verify_server(server_proof)?;
+//! ```rust
+//! # let client = crate::srp::client::SrpClient::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let verifier = client.process_reply(b"", b"", b"", b"", b"1").unwrap();
+//! # fn send_proof(_: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { vec![173, 202, 13, 26, 207, 73, 0, 46, 121, 238, 48, 170, 96, 146, 60, 49, 88, 76, 12, 184, 152, 76, 207, 220, 140, 205, 190, 189, 117, 6, 131, 63] }
+//!
+//! let client_proof = verifier.proof();
+//! let server_proof = send_proof(client_proof);
+//! verifier.verify_server(&server_proof).unwrap();
//! ```
//!
-//! `key` contains shared secret key between user and the server. Alternatively
-//! you can directly extract shared secret key using `get_key()` method and
-//! handle authentication through different (secure!) means (e.g. by using
-//! authenticated cipher mode).
+//! `key` contains shared secret key between user and the server. You can extract shared secret
+//! key using `key()` method.
+//! ```rust
+//! # let client = crate::srp::client::SrpClient::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let verifier = client.process_reply(b"", b"", b"", b"", b"1").unwrap();
+//!
+//! verifier.key();
+//!```
+//!
//!
//! For user registration on the server first generate salt (e.g. 32 bytes long)
//! and get password verifier which depends on private key. Send username, salt
//! and password verifier over protected channel to protect against
//! Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack for registration.
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let pwd_verifier = client.get_password_verifier(&private_key);
-//! conn.send_registration_data(username, salt, pwd_verifier);
+//! ```rust
+//! # let client = crate::srp::client::SrpClient::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let username = b"username";
+//! # let password = b"password";
+//! # let salt = b"salt";
+//! # fn send_registration_data(_: &[u8], _: &[u8], _: &[u8]) {}
+//!
+//! let pwd_verifier = client.compute_verifier(username, password, salt);
+//! send_registration_data(username, salt, &pwd_verifier);
//! ```
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use digest::{Digest, Output};
use num_bigint::BigUint;
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use crate::types::{SrpAuthError, SrpGroup};
+use crate::utils::{compute_k, compute_m1, compute_m2, compute_u};
/// SRP client state before handshake with the server.
pub struct SrpClient<'a, D: Digest> {
params: &'a SrpGroup,
-
- a: BigUint,
- a_pub: BigUint,
-
d: PhantomData<D>,
}
/// SRP client state after handshake with the server.
pub struct SrpClientVerifier<D: Digest> {
- proof: Output<D>,
- server_proof: Output<D>,
- key: Output<D>,
-}
-
-/// Compute user private key as described in the RFC 5054. Consider using proper
-/// password hashing algorithm instead.
-pub fn srp_private_key<D: Digest>(username: &[u8], password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> Output<D> {
- let p = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(username);
- d.update(b":");
- d.update(password);
- d.finalize()
- };
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(salt);
- d.update(p.as_slice());
- d.finalize()
+ m1: Output<D>,
+ m2: Output<D>,
+ key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl<'a, D: Digest> SrpClient<'a, D> {
/// Create new SRP client instance.
- pub fn new(a: &[u8], params: &'a SrpGroup) -> Self {
- let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(a);
- let a_pub = params.modpow(&a);
-
+ pub fn new(params: &'a SrpGroup) -> Self {
Self {
params,
- a,
- a_pub,
d: Default::default(),
}
}
- /// Get password verfier for user registration on the server
- pub fn get_password_verifier(&self, private_key: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
- let x = BigUint::from_bytes_be(private_key);
- let v = self.params.modpow(&x);
- v.to_bytes_be()
+ pub fn compute_a_pub(&self, a: &BigUint) -> BigUint {
+ self.params.g.modpow(a, &self.params.n)
}
- fn calc_key(&self, b_pub: &BigUint, x: &BigUint, u: &BigUint) -> Output<D> {
- let n = &self.params.n;
- let k = self.params.compute_k::<D>();
- let interm = (k * self.params.modpow(x)) % n;
- // Because we do operation in modulo N we can get: (kv + g^b) < kv
- let v = if *b_pub > interm {
- (b_pub - &interm) % n
- } else {
- (n + b_pub - &interm) % n
- };
- // S = |B - kg^x| ^ (a + ux)
- let s = v.modpow(&(&self.a + (u * x) % n), n);
- D::digest(&s.to_bytes_be())
+ // H(<username> | ":" | <raw password>)
+ pub fn compute_identity_hash(username: &[u8], password: &[u8]) -> Output<D> {
+ let mut d = D::new();
+ d.update(username);
+ d.update(b":");
+ d.update(password);
+ d.finalize()
}
- /// Process server reply to the handshake.
- pub fn process_reply(
- self,
- private_key: &[u8],
- b_pub: &[u8],
- ) -> Result<SrpClientVerifier<D>, SrpAuthError> {
- let u = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(b_pub);
- let h = d.finalize();
- BigUint::from_bytes_be(h.as_slice())
- };
-
- let b_pub = BigUint::from_bytes_be(b_pub);
+ // x = H(<salt> | H(<username> | ":" | <raw password>))
+ pub fn compute_x(identity_hash: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> BigUint {
+ let mut x = D::new();
+ x.update(salt);
+ x.update(identity_hash);
+ BigUint::from_bytes_be(&x.finalize())
+ }
- // Safeguard against malicious B
- if &b_pub % &self.params.n == BigUint::default() {
- return Err(SrpAuthError {
- description: "Malicious b_pub value",
- });
- }
+ // (B - (k * g^x)) ^ (a + (u * x)) % N
+ pub fn compute_premaster_secret(
+ &self,
+ b_pub: &BigUint,
+ k: &BigUint,
+ x: &BigUint,
+ a: &BigUint,
+ u: &BigUint,
+ ) -> BigUint {
+ // (k * g^x)
+ let base = (k * (self.params.g.modpow(x, &self.params.n))) % &self.params.n;
+ // Because we do operation in modulo N we can get: b_pub > base. That's not good. So we add N to b_pub to make sure.
+ // B - kg^x
+ let base = ((&self.params.n + b_pub) - &base) % &self.params.n;
+ let exp = (u * x) + a;
+ // S = (B - kg^x) ^ (a + ux)
+ // or
+ // S = base ^ exp
+ base.modpow(&exp, &self.params.n)
+ }
- let x = BigUint::from_bytes_be(private_key);
- let key = self.calc_key(&b_pub, &x, &u);
- // M1 = H(A, B, K)
- let proof = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&b_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&key);
- d.finalize()
- };
+ // v = g^x % N
+ pub fn compute_v(&self, x: &BigUint) -> BigUint {
+ self.params.g.modpow(x, &self.params.n)
+ }
- // M2 = H(A, M1, K)
- let server_proof = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&proof);
- d.update(&key);
- d.finalize()
- };
+ /// Get password verifier (v in RFC5054) for user registration on the server.
+ pub fn compute_verifier(&self, username: &[u8], password: &[u8], salt: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let identity_hash = Self::compute_identity_hash(username, password);
+ let x = Self::compute_x(identity_hash.as_slice(), salt);
+ self.compute_v(&x).to_bytes_be()
+ }
- Ok(SrpClientVerifier {
- proof,
- server_proof,
- key,
- })
+ /// Get public ephemeral value for handshaking with the server.
+ /// g^a % N
+ pub fn compute_public_ephemeral(&self, a: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.compute_a_pub(&BigUint::from_bytes_be(a)).to_bytes_be()
}
- /// Process server reply to the handshake with username and salt.
- #[allow(non_snake_case)]
- pub fn process_reply_with_username_and_salt(
- self,
+ /// Process server reply to the handshake.
+ /// a is a random value,
+ /// username, password is supplied by the user
+ /// salt and b_pub come from the server
+ pub fn process_reply(
+ &self,
+ a: &[u8],
username: &[u8],
+ password: &[u8],
salt: &[u8],
- private_key: &[u8],
b_pub: &[u8],
) -> Result<SrpClientVerifier<D>, SrpAuthError> {
- let u = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(b_pub);
- let h = d.finalize();
- BigUint::from_bytes_be(h.as_slice())
- };
-
+ let a = BigUint::from_bytes_be(a);
+ let a_pub = self.compute_a_pub(&a);
let b_pub = BigUint::from_bytes_be(b_pub);
// Safeguard against malicious B
if &b_pub % &self.params.n == BigUint::default() {
- return Err(SrpAuthError {
- description: "Malicious b_pub value",
- });
+ return Err(SrpAuthError::IllegalParameter("b_pub".to_owned()));
}
- let x = BigUint::from_bytes_be(private_key);
- let key = self.calc_key(&b_pub, &x, &u);
- // M1 = H(H(N)^H(g), H(I), salt, A, B, K)
- let proof = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(username);
- let h = d.finalize_reset();
- let I: &[u8] = h.as_slice();
+ let u = compute_u::<D>(&a_pub.to_bytes_be(), &b_pub.to_bytes_be());
+ let k = compute_k::<D>(self.params);
+ let identity_hash = Self::compute_identity_hash(username, password);
+ let x = Self::compute_x(identity_hash.as_slice(), salt);
+
+ let key = self.compute_premaster_secret(&b_pub, &k, &x, &a, &u);
- d.update(self.params.compute_hash_n_xor_hash_g::<D>());
- d.update(I);
- d.update(salt);
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&b_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&key.to_vec());
- d.finalize()
- };
+ let m1 = compute_m1::<D>(
+ &a_pub.to_bytes_be(),
+ &b_pub.to_bytes_be(),
+ &key.to_bytes_be(),
+ );
- // M2 = H(A, M1, K)
- let server_proof = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&proof);
- d.update(&key);
- d.finalize()
- };
+ let m2 = compute_m2::<D>(&a_pub.to_bytes_be(), &m1, &key.to_bytes_be());
Ok(SrpClientVerifier {
- proof,
- server_proof,
- key,
+ m1,
+ m2,
+ key: key.to_bytes_be(),
})
}
-
- /// Get public ephemeral value for handshaking with the server.
- pub fn get_a_pub(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- self.a_pub.to_bytes_be()
- }
}
impl<D: Digest> SrpClientVerifier<D> {
/// Get shared secret key without authenticating server, e.g. for using with
/// authenticated encryption modes. DO NOT USE this method without
/// some kind of secure authentication
- pub fn get_key(self) -> Output<D> {
- self.key
+ pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ &self.key
}
/// Verification data for sending to the server.
- pub fn get_proof(&self) -> Output<D> {
- self.proof.clone()
+ pub fn proof(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ self.m1.as_slice()
}
- /// Verify server reply to verification data. It will return shared secret
- /// key in case of success.
- pub fn verify_server(self, reply: &[u8]) -> Result<Output<D>, SrpAuthError> {
- if self.server_proof.as_slice() != reply {
- Err(SrpAuthError {
- description: "Incorrect server proof",
- })
+ /// Verify server reply to verification data.
+ pub fn verify_server(&self, reply: &[u8]) -> Result<(), SrpAuthError> {
+ if self.m2.ct_eq(reply).unwrap_u8() != 1 {
+ // aka == 0
+ Err(SrpAuthError::BadRecordMac("server".to_owned()))
} else {
- Ok(self.key)
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
diff --git a/srp/src/lib.rs b/srp/src/lib.rs
index 375dfb3..9ce0346 100644
--- a/srp/src/lib.rs
+++ b/srp/src/lib.rs
@@ -10,12 +10,6 @@
//! srp = "0.4"
//! ```
//!
-//! and this to your crate root:
-//!
-//! ```rust
-//! extern crate srp;
-//! ```
-//!
//! Next read documentation for [`client`](client/index.html) and
//! [`server`](server/index.html) modules.
//!
@@ -60,3 +54,4 @@ pub mod client;
pub mod groups;
pub mod server;
pub mod types;
+pub mod utils;
diff --git a/srp/src/prime.bin b/srp/src/prime.bin
deleted file mode 100644
index d2109b7..0000000
--- a/srp/src/prime.bin
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-_ P<=èyCp^ >Hhw Bb{+2,ZuHEXrӋto 'Tw;䪗Dl'$2/ A-tcK2-懘2u7 \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/srp/src/server.rs b/srp/src/server.rs
index 299c1ce..0ecc17c 100644
--- a/srp/src/server.rs
+++ b/srp/src/server.rs
@@ -2,145 +2,184 @@
//!
//! # Usage
//! First receive user's username and public value `a_pub`, retrieve from a
-//! database `UserRecord` for a given username, generate `b` (e.g. 512 bits
-//! long) and initialize SRP server instance:
+//! database the salt and verifier for a given username. Generate `b` and public value `b_pub`.
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! use srp::groups::G_2048;
//!
-//! let (username, a_pub) = conn.receive_handshake();
-//! let user = db.retrieve_user_record(username);
-//! let b = [0u8; 64];
-//! rng.fill_bytes(&mut b);
-//! let server = SrpServer::<Sha256>::new(&user, &a_pub, &b, &G_2048)?;
+//! ```rust
+//! use crate::srp::groups::G_2048;
+//! use sha2::Sha256; // Note: You should probably use a proper password KDF
+//! # use crate::srp::server::SrpServer;
+//! # fn get_client_request()-> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) { (vec![], vec![])}
+//! # fn get_user(_: &[u8])-> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) { (vec![], vec![])}
+//!
+//! let server = SrpServer::<Sha256>::new(&G_2048);
+//! let (username, a_pub) = get_client_request();
+//! let (salt, v) = get_user(&username);
+//! let mut b = [0u8; 64];
+//! // rng.fill_bytes(&mut b);
+//! let b_pub = server.compute_public_ephemeral(&b, &v);
//! ```
//!
-//! Next send to user `b_pub` and `salt` from user record:
+//! Next send to user `b_pub` and `salt` from user record
+//!
+//! Next process the user response:
+//!
+//! ```rust
+//! # let server = crate::srp::server::SrpServer::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # fn get_client_response() -> Vec<u8> { vec![1] }
+//! # let b = [0u8; 64];
+//! # let v = b"";
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let b_pub = server.get_b_pub();
-//! conn.reply_to_handshake(&user.salt, b_pub);
+//! let a_pub = get_client_response();
+//! let verifier = server.process_reply(&b, v, &a_pub).unwrap();
//! ```
//!
+//!
//! And finally receive user proof, verify it and send server proof in the
//! reply:
//!
-//! ```ignore
-//! let user_proof = conn.receive_proof();
-//! let server_proof = server.verify(user_proof)?;
-//! conn.send_proof(server_proof);
+//! ```rust
+//! # let server = crate::srp::server::SrpServer::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let verifier = server.process_reply(b"", b"", b"1").unwrap();
+//! # fn get_client_proof()-> Vec<u8> { vec![26, 80, 8, 243, 111, 162, 238, 171, 208, 237, 207, 46, 46, 137, 44, 213, 105, 208, 84, 224, 244, 216, 103, 145, 14, 103, 182, 56, 242, 4, 179, 57] };
+//! # fn send_proof(_: &[u8]) { };
+//!
+//! let client_proof = get_client_proof();
+//! verifier.verify_client(&client_proof).unwrap();
+//! send_proof(verifier.proof());
//! ```
//!
-//! To get the shared secret use `get_key` method. As alternative to using
-//! `verify` method it's also possible to use this key for authentificated
-//! encryption.
+//!
+//! `key` contains shared secret key between user and the server. You can extract shared secret
+//! key using `key()` method.
+//! ```rust
+//! # let server = crate::srp::server::SrpServer::<sha2::Sha256>::new(&crate::srp::groups::G_2048);
+//! # let verifier = server.process_reply(b"", b"", b"1").unwrap();
+//!
+//! verifier.key();
+//!```
+//!
use std::marker::PhantomData;
use digest::{Digest, Output};
use num_bigint::BigUint;
+use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use crate::types::{SrpAuthError, SrpGroup};
-
-/// Data provided by users upon registration, usually stored in the database.
-pub struct UserRecord<'a> {
- pub username: &'a [u8],
- pub salt: &'a [u8],
- /// Password verifier
- pub verifier: &'a [u8],
-}
+use crate::utils::{compute_k, compute_m1, compute_m2, compute_u};
/// SRP server state
-pub struct SrpServer<D: Digest> {
- b: BigUint,
- a_pub: BigUint,
- b_pub: BigUint,
-
- key: Output<D>,
-
+pub struct SrpServer<'a, D: Digest> {
+ params: &'a SrpGroup,
d: PhantomData<D>,
}
-impl<D: Digest> SrpServer<D> {
+/// SRP server state after handshake with the client.
+pub struct SrpServerVerifier<D: Digest> {
+ m1: Output<D>,
+ m2: Output<D>,
+ key: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl<'a, D: Digest> SrpServer<'a, D> {
/// Create new server state.
- pub fn new(
- user: &UserRecord<'_>,
- a_pub: &[u8],
+ pub fn new(params: &'a SrpGroup) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ params,
+ d: Default::default(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ // k*v + g^b % N
+ pub fn compute_b_pub(&self, b: &BigUint, k: &BigUint, v: &BigUint) -> BigUint {
+ let inter = (k * v) % &self.params.n;
+ (inter + self.params.g.modpow(b, &self.params.n)) % &self.params.n
+ }
+
+ // <premaster secret> = (A * v^u) ^ b % N
+ pub fn compute_premaster_secret(
+ &self,
+ a_pub: &BigUint,
+ v: &BigUint,
+ u: &BigUint,
+ b: &BigUint,
+ ) -> BigUint {
+ // (A * v^u)
+ let base = (a_pub * v.modpow(u, &self.params.n)) % &self.params.n;
+ base.modpow(b, &self.params.n)
+ }
+
+ /// Get public ephemeral value for sending to the client.
+ pub fn compute_public_ephemeral(&self, b: &[u8], v: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
+ self.compute_b_pub(
+ &BigUint::from_bytes_be(b),
+ &compute_k::<D>(self.params),
+ &BigUint::from_bytes_be(v),
+ )
+ .to_bytes_be()
+ }
+
+ /// Process client reply to the handshake.
+ /// b is a random value,
+ /// v is the provided during initial user registration
+ pub fn process_reply(
+ &self,
b: &[u8],
- params: &SrpGroup,
- ) -> Result<Self, SrpAuthError> {
+ v: &[u8],
+ a_pub: &[u8],
+ ) -> Result<SrpServerVerifier<D>, SrpAuthError> {
+ let b = BigUint::from_bytes_be(b);
+ let v = BigUint::from_bytes_be(v);
let a_pub = BigUint::from_bytes_be(a_pub);
+
+ let k = compute_k::<D>(self.params);
+ let b_pub = self.compute_b_pub(&b, &k, &v);
+
// Safeguard against malicious A
- if &a_pub % &params.n == BigUint::default() {
- return Err(SrpAuthError {
- description: "Malicious a_pub value",
- });
+ if &a_pub % &self.params.n == BigUint::default() {
+ return Err(SrpAuthError::IllegalParameter("a_pub".to_owned()));
}
- let v = BigUint::from_bytes_be(user.verifier);
- let b = BigUint::from_bytes_be(b) % &params.n;
- let k = params.compute_k::<D>();
- // kv + g^b
- let interm = (k * &v) % &params.n;
- let b_pub = (interm + &params.modpow(&b)) % &params.n;
- // H(A || B)
- let u = {
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&b_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.finalize()
- };
- let d = Default::default();
- //(Av^u) ^ b
- let key = {
- let u = BigUint::from_bytes_be(u.as_slice());
- let t = (&a_pub * v.modpow(&u, &params.n)) % &params.n;
- let s = t.modpow(&b, &params.n);
- D::digest(&s.to_bytes_be())
- };
- Ok(Self {
- b,
- a_pub,
- b_pub,
- key,
- d,
- })
- }
- /// Get private `b` value. (see `new_with_b` documentation)
- pub fn get_b(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- self.b.to_bytes_be()
- }
+ let u = compute_u::<D>(&a_pub.to_bytes_be(), &b_pub.to_bytes_be());
+
+ let key = self.compute_premaster_secret(&a_pub, &v, &u, &b);
+
+ let m1 = compute_m1::<D>(
+ &a_pub.to_bytes_be(),
+ &b_pub.to_bytes_be(),
+ &key.to_bytes_be(),
+ );
+
+ let m2 = compute_m2::<D>(&a_pub.to_bytes_be(), &m1, &key.to_bytes_be());
- /// Get public `b_pub` value for sending to the user.
- pub fn get_b_pub(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- self.b_pub.to_bytes_be()
+ Ok(SrpServerVerifier {
+ m1,
+ m2,
+ key: key.to_bytes_be(),
+ })
}
+}
+impl<D: Digest> SrpServerVerifier<D> {
/// Get shared secret between user and the server. (do not forget to verify
/// that keys are the same!)
- pub fn get_key(&self) -> Output<D> {
- self.key.clone()
+ pub fn key(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ &self.key
+ }
+
+ /// Verification data for sending to the client.
+ pub fn proof(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ // TODO not Output
+ self.m2.as_slice()
}
- /// Process user proof of having the same shared secret and compute
- /// server proof for sending to the user.
- pub fn verify(&self, user_proof: &[u8]) -> Result<Output<D>, SrpAuthError> {
- // M = H(A, B, K)
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&self.b_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(&self.key);
-
- if user_proof == d.finalize().as_slice() {
- // H(A, M, K)
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&self.a_pub.to_bytes_be());
- d.update(user_proof);
- d.update(&self.key);
- Ok(d.finalize())
+ /// Process user proof of having the same shared secret.
+ pub fn verify_client(&self, reply: &[u8]) -> Result<(), SrpAuthError> {
+ if self.m1.ct_eq(reply).unwrap_u8() != 1 {
+ // aka == 0
+ Err(SrpAuthError::BadRecordMac("client".to_owned()))
} else {
- Err(SrpAuthError {
- description: "Incorrect user proof",
- })
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
diff --git a/srp/src/k_sha1_1024.bin b/srp/src/test/k_sha1_1024.bin
index 4408438..4408438 100644
--- a/srp/src/k_sha1_1024.bin
+++ b/srp/src/test/k_sha1_1024.bin
diff --git a/srp/src/types.rs b/srp/src/types.rs
index a23954e..a356caf 100644
--- a/srp/src/types.rs
+++ b/srp/src/types.rs
@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
//! Additional SRP types.
-use digest::Digest;
use num_bigint::BigUint;
-use std::{error, fmt};
+use std::fmt;
/// SRP authentication error.
-#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
-pub struct SrpAuthError {
- pub(crate) description: &'static str,
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub enum SrpAuthError {
+ IllegalParameter(String),
+ BadRecordMac(String),
}
impl fmt::Display for SrpAuthError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
- write!(f, "SRP authentication error")
- }
-}
-
-impl error::Error for SrpAuthError {
- fn description(&self) -> &str {
- self.description
+ match self {
+ SrpAuthError::IllegalParameter(param) => {
+ write!(f, "illegal_parameter: bad '{}' value", param)
+ }
+ SrpAuthError::BadRecordMac(param) => {
+ write!(f, "bad_record_mac: incorrect '{}' proof", param)
+ }
+ }
}
}
@@ -30,56 +31,15 @@ pub struct SrpGroup {
pub g: BigUint,
}
-impl SrpGroup {
- pub(crate) fn modpow(&self, v: &BigUint) -> BigUint {
- self.g.modpow(v, &self.n)
- }
-
- /// Compute `k` with given hash function and return SRP parameters
- pub(crate) fn compute_k<D: Digest>(&self) -> BigUint {
- let n = self.n.to_bytes_be();
- let g_bytes = self.g.to_bytes_be();
- let mut buf = vec![0u8; n.len()];
- let l = n.len() - g_bytes.len();
- buf[l..].copy_from_slice(&g_bytes);
-
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&n);
- d.update(&buf);
- BigUint::from_bytes_be(d.finalize().as_slice())
- }
-
- /// Compute `Hash(N) xor Hash(g)` with given hash function and return SRP parameters
- pub(crate) fn compute_hash_n_xor_hash_g<D: Digest>(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
- let n = self.n.to_bytes_be();
- let g_bytes = self.g.to_bytes_be();
- let mut buf = vec![0u8; n.len()];
- let l = n.len() - g_bytes.len();
- buf[l..].copy_from_slice(&g_bytes);
-
- let mut d = D::new();
- d.update(&n);
- let h = d.finalize_reset();
- let h_n: &[u8] = h.as_slice();
- d.update(&buf);
- let h = d.finalize_reset();
- let h_g: &[u8] = h.as_slice();
-
- h_n.iter()
- .zip(h_g.iter())
- .map(|(&x1, &x2)| x1 ^ x2)
- .collect()
- }
-}
-
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use crate::groups::G_1024;
+ use crate::utils::compute_k;
use sha1::Sha1;
#[test]
fn test_k_1024_sha1() {
- let k = G_1024.compute_k::<Sha1>().to_bytes_be();
- assert_eq!(&k, include_bytes!("k_sha1_1024.bin"));
+ let k = compute_k::<Sha1>(&G_1024).to_bytes_be();
+ assert_eq!(&k, include_bytes!("test/k_sha1_1024.bin"));
}
}
diff --git a/srp/src/utils.rs b/srp/src/utils.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9372bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/srp/src/utils.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+use digest::{Digest, Output};
+use num_bigint::BigUint;
+
+use crate::types::SrpGroup;
+
+// u = H(PAD(A) | PAD(B))
+pub fn compute_u<D: Digest>(a_pub: &[u8], b_pub: &[u8]) -> BigUint {
+ let mut u = D::new();
+ u.update(a_pub);
+ u.update(b_pub);
+ BigUint::from_bytes_be(&u.finalize())
+}
+
+// k = H(N | PAD(g))
+pub fn compute_k<D: Digest>(params: &SrpGroup) -> BigUint {
+ let n = params.n.to_bytes_be();
+ let g_bytes = params.g.to_bytes_be();
+ let mut buf = vec![0u8; n.len()];
+ let l = n.len() - g_bytes.len();
+ buf[l..].copy_from_slice(&g_bytes);
+
+ let mut d = D::new();
+ d.update(&n);
+ d.update(&buf);
+ BigUint::from_bytes_be(d.finalize().as_slice())
+}
+
+// M1 = H(A, B, K) this doesn't follow the spec but apparently no one does for M1
+// M1 should equal = H(H(N) XOR H(g) | H(U) | s | A | B | K) according to the spec
+pub fn compute_m1<D: Digest>(a_pub: &[u8], b_pub: &[u8], key: &[u8]) -> Output<D> {
+ let mut d = D::new();
+ d.update(a_pub);
+ d.update(b_pub);
+ d.update(key);
+ d.finalize()
+}
+
+// M2 = H(A, M1, K)
+pub fn compute_m2<D: Digest>(a_pub: &[u8], m1: &Output<D>, key: &[u8]) -> Output<D> {
+ let mut d = D::new();
+ d.update(&a_pub);
+ d.update(&m1);
+ d.update(&key);
+ d.finalize()
+}